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STATUS OF PROCEEDINGS 
On September 29, 1983, appellants The Clovis National 
BL and The Citizens Bank of Clovis (the "Clovis Banks") filed 
their brief (the "Clovis Brief") in this appeal. Respondent 
Ar ]as Corporation ("At las") filed its brief (the "At las Brief") 
~ 1 th the Court on October 31, 1983. The Clovis Banks now submit 
this Reply Brief which responds to new arguments and theories 
raised by At las in its brief. 
INTRODUCTION 
In its brief, Atlas demonstrates its continuing inabi-
!ity to get its story straight. Atlas still has not formulated a 
consistent construction of the Agreements that can support the 
district court's ruling. On the most crucial factual and 
construction issues, Atlas' argument collapses in self-contra-
dictions. For example, at one point in its brief, Atlas unambi-
guously disavows the "one ore body" theory upon which it relied 
in the court below, 1 and upon which the district court at least 
in part based its decision, see, ~·, Findings and Conclusions 
r~l1ll, 19-21, 29, 39, R. 2084-86, 2089-2092, 2098. Atlas now 
't~ues that the Agreements covered a single "mining venture" and 
I 
·oce, ~._g., Motion of Atlas for Summary Judgment at 33, R. 
l\Q/ For the Court's convenience, the Clovis Banks will 
1-ont1nue the citation form used in the Clovis Brief. Citations 
to documents in the record will include the title of the 
00 cument, the page number or section of the document, and a 
CJtation to the record. 
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the "aining venture" involved a single ore body, but that was ,, 
aerely the way things turned out; 
ulited the "venture" to one body. 
nothing in the Agreements 
Atlas Brief at 49. In place 
of- the "one ore body" theory, Atlas substitutes a "sequential 
operation" construction. Using this logic, Atlas asserts that 
the Agreements contemplated a conditional sequence of operations 
which, once performed, caused the Agreements to expire. Yet when 
this construction, in turn, collides with language in the 
Agreements expressly providing for "exploration, drilling, 
development, [and] mining" after the initial sequence of 
operations, see Operating Agreement § Ill, 1548-49, Atlas simply 
reverts to its earlier story. The damaging language, Atlas 
argues, must be understood to refer only to additional operations 
on the first ore body. Atlas Brief at 37-38. 
Atlas similarly vacillates in its description of the 
most essential facts. Attempting to support the district court's 
ruling, Atlas indicates at one point that the Claims had been 
fully explored before the Bardon Shaft was abandoned in late 1960 
or early 1961, so that the closure of the Bardon Shaft completed 
performance, and the Agreements and the Net Profits Interest were 
extinquished at that time. Atlas Brief at 23 n. 7. However, 
when confronted with incontrovertible evidence that Kerr-McGee 
planned further operations and considered the Agreements to be in 
effect in 1962, see ~., Letter from Kerr-McGee to Wm. Dean 
HcDougald (Hay 9, 1962), R. 1882; Affidavit of Richard T. Zitting 
-2-
1773, Atlas abandons this position and argues that 
,1-Hc:Gee must have completed performance, and resolved that no 
4 
1.lnt.er work would be done, "some time near December 30, 1962." 
Atlas Brief at 50 n. 142 (emphasis added). 
These contradictions are not inadvertencies, they 
reflect the fact that Atlas is spinning a tale which has only 
occasional and tenuous connections to the actual language of the 
Agreements and to the evidence of what actually happened. A 
review of Atlas' arguments demonstrates that Atlas cannot invent, 
much less support, a construction of the Agreements or a version 
of the historical events that would sustain the district court's 
rulings, As a result, even if its contradictions could be 
~erlooked, Atlas' argument is manifestly inadequate to support a 
summary judgment. 
The arguments offered by Atlas attempt to divert the 
Court's attention from a common sense evaluation of the trans-
action as a whole to an approach that requires an intricate 
dissection of a few of the words and phrases used in the Agree-
merits. The intricate construction urged by Atlas places more 
emphasis on these isolated bits of the Agreements than the 
;a.ties could have possibly contemplated. As will be demon-
' ''' 1 <o<l. this Court should not focus upon the subtle intricacies 
,J shadings urged by Atlas or follow the numerous "red herrings" 
:·ff~red by Atlas to support its irrelevant conclusions. Rather, 
the Court should step back from the 1957 transaction and view it 
-3-
as a whole, giving a fair and literal meaning to the language ut 
.. ' 2 
t1w Agreements. 
a~ording to their 
The Court should enforce the Agreements 
plain meaning and give effect to the deal as 
struck by the parties in 1957 rather than as viewed by the 
district court, which based its construction upon an unantici-
pated hiatus in operations that occurred in the 1960' s. 
The Court should reverse the decision of the district 
court and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment in 
favor of the Clovis Banks. 
2rn so doing, the Court should seek to answer a few basic 
questions. First, did the Interest Owners clearly intend to give 
up all of their interest in over 700 acres of mining claims in 
exchange for a one-shot exploration effort on one edge of the 
Claims by Kerr-McGee? The potential of the Claims was obviously 
known to them, see Deposition of R. D. Boone at 36-37, 42, R. 
1142-43, 1148, but only a fraction of the Claims had been 
explored, see, Deposition of William McDougald at 75(4) - 77(10), 
116(21) - 117(19), R. 447-48, 488-89. Second, could the parties 
have clearly intended that the express language of duration set 
forth in the Operating Agreement be superceded by implied 
language that limited their deal to a "single mining venture"? 
Third, after acknowledging that the Operating Agreement pertained 
to all of the Claims, could Kerr-McGee's actions in abandoning a 
very specifically described 7.5 acre tract be implied to 
terminate the entire Agreement? Finally, by defining a series of 
activities related to evaluation and development of the initial 
exploration target, did the parties mean to rule out all later 
exploration and development activities? If all of these 
questions or the numerous other questions raised in this brief 
cannot be answered with an unequivocal "yes", this Court must 
reverse the judgment of the district court and rule in favor of 
the Clovis Banks. 
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ARGUMENT 
ATLAS HAS_JAILED TO PRESENT ANY PLAUSIBLE RATIONALE TO 
SUPPLll(T_l_HE_DISTRICT COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT THE AGREEMENTS 
AJ'[l THE NET PROFITS INTEREST HAVE EXPIRED OR TERMINATED. 
A At las· Content ion that the Agreements Contemplated a 
':_Conditional and Sequential" Operation cannot Support 
the Conclusion that the Agreements, or the Net Profits 
Interest, Have Expired. 
Atlas' principal argument is that the Agreements 
contemplated a sequence of operations in which only the first 
stage,~-, exploration, was mandatory. Under this theory, only 
if exploration resulted in the discovery of ore would a mir.e be 
developed, and only if the mine generated profits would there be 
, d1str1but1on of proceeds. This argument proves precisely 
notlnng, since it is undisputed that exploration has occurred, a 
ml!le has been developed, and profits have been generated. 
Indeed, Atlas wholly misconceives the "conditional" 
:.ature of the operator's obligations. That a mine cannot be 
developed unless ore is found, and that profits cannot be distri-
b'J\ ed unless they are generated, are not consequences of any 
'conditions" imposed by the Agreements. Rather, they are simply 
"tnous facts of nature. The provisions creating the Net Profits 
i1°terest do not refer to any conditions, but make the interest 
·r·1 i1c<1ble to "all ores mined, produced, saved and sold from said 
'W• Agreement at 5, R. 1540; Operating Agreement at 4, R. 
1 '49 Of course, if no ores were "mined, produced, saved and 
0 old" no revenue would be generated for the Net Profits Interest 
owners. This result would not be because the interest would 
-5-
"terainate" or "expire," but would merely be because there would .. 
be,no profits to d1str1bute. On the other hand, when ore is 
fJind and profits are generated (as has in fact happened), the 
provisions applicable to such profits must determine their 
distribution. 
Attempting to confer cogency on its argument, Atlas 
asserts that the Agreements contemplated a sequential operation 
that would be performed only once, and that subsequent operations 
would thus not be covered by the Agreements. Atlas Brief at 
36-38. This construction must be rejected for at least three 
reasons. First, At las has conjured up the "single sequence" 
construction out of the air; the Agreements nowhere state that 
they are limited to a single sequence of operations. Instead, 
the Agreements expressly provide that they will continue in force 
so long as any of the Claims are in effect. See~·· Operating 
Agreement at 2, R. 1547. Second, the "sequential operation" 
language upon which Atlas purports to rely appears in a section 
dealing with "Commencement of Activities .. " Id. at 3, R. 
1548 (emphasis supplied). Thus, the very title of the section 
indicates that any sequence of operations described therein 
cannot be understood to limit the entire scope of activity, but 
aerely refers to the initial exploration target. Moreover, the 
aame section upon which Atlas relies as the foundation for its 
theory expressly provides for additional "exploration, drillinfu 
development, [and] mining" after the initial operations. Id. 
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'" language affirmatively proves that the Agreements did not 
.,~template only a one-shot sequence of operations. 
A~as provides no basis for interpreting these 
Finally, 
express 
;b1igations as anything more than additional express obligations 
undertaken by the operator that were not conditions precedent to 
~nything. 
B. Atlas' Contention that the Agreements were "Fully 
Performed" Is Wholly Without Support in the 
Evidence or in the Agreements. 
Atlas contends that after initial exploration of the 
Claims, Kerr-McGee decided that further exploration was unwar-
ranted. Atlas Brief at 24-25. Atlas argues that this supposed 
,1ec1s1on meant that performance was "complete," thus somehow 
causing the Agreements to terminate. Id. The assertion that 
¥err-McGee decided further exploration was unwarranted is rank 
fiction. See infra at pp. 44-48. Yet even if Kerr-McGee had 
reached such a decision, the contention that this decision would 
have terminated the Agreements or extinguished the other parties' 
rights is flatly at odds with the language of the Agreements. 
~uwhere in the Agreements is there any provision defining "full 
performance" or indicating that upon any level of performance the 
'' e~ments would terminate or expire. Instead, the Agreements 
P10v1de that they will not terminate so long as any of the Claims 
remain in force. See Operating Agreement § I, R. 1547. Atlas' 
argument seeks to rewrite not only the Agreements in this case, 
-7-
but the law of contracts as well. Agreements often create 
-Vtiple obligations. A party's performance of one obligation 
a.ling multiple obligations hardly operates to discharge the other 
obiigations or to terminate the agreement. Yet according to 
Atlas, that has happened in this case. 3 
The Agreements imposed a number of obligations on the 
operator. Section 5 of the Agreement and the first part of 
Section III of the Operating Agreement require the operator to 
explore and develop the Claims. Section 6 of the Agreement and 
the second part of Section III of the Operating Agreement require 
the operator to pay the Interest Owners a specified percentage of 
"all ores mined, produced and sold from said claims." Atlas 
argues that the alleged performance of the first duty by Kerr-
McGee, the original operator, discharged the latter duty as well, 
3Atlas' proposed construction is flatly at odds with this 
Court's policy of construing contracts and evidence in a manner 
that does not work a forfeiture of rights. As this Court 
declared in Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Utah 
1972): 
[I]nasmuch as the plaintiff had its attorneys 
draw the contract, its provisions should be 
construed most strictly against plaintiff, and 
this is especially true as to a forfeiture, 
which is enforced only when the terms are 
clear and unequivocal. 
See also U-Beva Hines v. Toledo Mining Co., 471 P.2d 867, 869 
(Utah 1970) (recognizing a "generally accepted policy against 
forfeiture. ."); cf. Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Revie~. 
568 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1977) ("a statute for a forfeiture should 
be strictly construed"). 
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1 ~ 8 1 the operator was no longer required to distribute profits 
:rt•UJ ores mined, produced and sold from the Claims. Atlas Brief 
aJ 24·33. There is simply no support, either in contract law or 
in the language of the Agreements, for this strikingly illogical 
. 4 
conclusion. 
Atlas seeks refuge in a number of hypotheticals that 
are counterfactual and thus beside the point. (~., If no ore 
had been found, then . If no profits had been earned, then 
. . ) Atlas Brief at 19-22, 36. However, a different hypo-
thetical, which upon inspection turns out not to be counter-
factual, highlights the absurdity of Atlas' reasoning. Suppose 
Kerr· McGee had explored and, finding nothing at first, had 
4
At las' content ion that Kerr-McGee fully performed its duty to 
explore merely attempts to divert the Court's attention to a 
false issue which need not even be addressed. Atlas argues at 
length that the Operator's duty cannot be understood to require 
endless exploration, Atlas Brief at 32, and that any claim the 
Interest Owners may have had for breach of this duty has been 
lost by inaction and passage of time, id. at 52-53. Such 
arguments amount to a mere red herring. The Clovis Banks have 
not alleged any such breach. To be sure, the extent of an 
operator's duty to explore may, in some cases, raise difficult 
questions. Those questions are hardly pertinent here. In the 
present case, it is undisputed that Kerr-McGee and/or at least 
ur1e of its successors did conduct further exploration of the 
Lla1m5 after closure of the Bardon Shaft, and that such explora-
' '""has resulted in the discovery and mining of vast amounts of 
v!>c See Clovis Brief at 10; Atlas Brief at 13. Moreover, it is 
1111d1sputed that the Agreements contain unambiguous provisions 
defining the parties' rights to share in the profits from that 
"re ~ee Agreement '116, R. 1540-41; Operating Agreement §§ Ill, 
!\', R. 1549-50. How other provisions in the Agreements might be 
'nterpreted if the facts had been different is a question far 
beyond the bounds of proper consideration. 
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de~ided and announced that further exploration was not justified, 
L bl then changed its mind, resumed exploration, and struck a 
b anza. Kerr-McGee obviously could not have claimed that its 
earlier decision to end exploration had extinquished the Interest 
Owners' rights to their specified share of the profits. Yet 
(although there is in reality no evidence that Kerr-McGee or the 
subsequent operator ever decided to discontinue exploration), 
that is in substance exactly the claim that Atlas now makes. To 
be sure, the bonanza was discovered not by Kerr-McGee itself but 
by a successor. That fact makes no difference, however, because, 
the Agreements are unambiguously applicable to "successors and 
assigns." 
Atlas' present construction necessarily acknowledges 
that if Kerr-McGee had found and mined additional ore, then the 
production of such ore would have been subject to the Net Profits 
lnterest. 5 Thus, the unavoidable conclusion is that the 
Agreements, and the Net Profits Interest, do~ to the profits 
earned by Atlas as Kerr-McGee's successor. 6 
5 Atlas Brief at 49: "The AGREEMENTS, and the mining venture, 
applied to whatever KERR-MCGEE found in its testing, defining and 
developing of the SUBJECT CLAIMS." 
6Any other interpretation would be unreasonable, since it would 
allow any operator to acquire mining property and then imme-
diately nullify all of the grantor's reserved rights simply by 
conveying the property to a successor. General principles of 
contract construction require that such unreasonable inter-
pretations be disregarded. See, .!...:..S·, Weiner v. Wilshire Oil 
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c. Atlas Has Offered No Colorable Explanation for the 
Numerous Provisions Making the Net Profits 
Interest Applicable to All Ores Mined from ''Said 
Claims" So Long as the Claims Remain in Force. 
Atlas' assertions that the Agreements contemplated a 
sequential operation and that Kerr-McGee fulfilled its duty to 
explore the Claims exhaust Atlas' affirmative arguments for its 
tavored construction. The balance of Atlas' construction argu-
ments consists of an effort to explain away the provisions 
stating that the Agreements continue in effect so long as the 
:!aims are in force and that the Net Profits Interest applies to 
"all ores" mined from "said claims." However, the proferred 
explanations merely serve to underscore the frailty of Atlas' 
position. 
1. Section I - the "Period of Agreement" provision. 
Section I of the Operating Agreement defines the 
"Period of Agreement Concerning Operations," and unambiguously 
provides that the Agreements will continue so long as any of the 
r!a1ms remain in force. Operating Agreement at 2, R. 1547. 
Acknowledging that the Claim!> are still in force and that no 
ternnnation has occurred under Section I, Atlas suggests that the 
oection is only one of "many limitations" on duration contained 
n tl,e Agreements, and that the Agreements were terminated under 
0 ther limitation provisions. Atlas Brief at 17-18. 
~, 192 Kan. 490, 389 P.2d 803 (1964). 
-11-
In making this argument, Atlas studiously avoids 
<' 
actually quoting Section I, 
cildes Atlas' construction. 
because the language in fact pre-
Indeed, Section I is not a "limita-
tii>n" provision at all, but rather a non-limitation provision: 
It is agreed by and between the parties 
hereto that this Agreement shall be in full 
force and effect so long as any of the mining 
claims hereinabove identified and described 
are in force and effect. 
Operating Agreement § I. R. 1547. 
Thus, Section I does not establish conditions for 
limiting or terminating the Agreement. Its whole effect is to 
disclaim any such conditions. The plain language of Section I, 
therefore, precludes precisely the kind of "implicit termination" 
construction that Atlas urges. Moreover, Atlas' suggestion that 
Section I was included in the Agreements merely to cover the 
possible situation in which "the United States or some rival 
locator (might] obtain a ruling that the SUBJECT CLAIMS were 
invalid," Atlas Brief at 17, would simply render the section 
superfluous. A determination of invalidity would obviously 
nullify the parties' rights and duties under the Operating 
Agreement as a matter of law. Moreover, even if the actual 
language of Section I could be disregarded, as Atlas evidently 
prefers, it is hardly likely that the parties would have included 
under the title of "Period of Agreement" in the very first 
section of the Operating Agreement, such an utterly pointless 
provision. 
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2. The provisions tying the duration of the Net 
Profits Interest and the Agreements to "said 
claims." 
It fl As noted in the Clovis Brief, the Agreement and Operat-
1rrg Agreement repeatedly make their duration and the parties' 
rights and obligations co-extensive with the duration of the 
Claims. Clovis Brief at 18-22. The Net Profits Interest, for 
example, is expressly made applicable to "all ores mined, pro-
duced, saved and sold from said claims." Operating Agreement at 
4, R. 1549 (emphasis added). 
In response, Atlas boldly asserts that the phrase "said 
claims" are used "in conjunction with - even interchangeably with 
· the terms mine'; ore body', and 'shaft.'" Atlas Brief at 39. 
However, Atlas does not cite a single instance of such supposed 
interchangeable usage. Thus, while the meaning of the phrase is 
obviously crucial in the construction of the Agreements, Atlas 
offers not even the barest pretense of textual support for its 
proposed construction. 
In fact, the Agreements are perfectly clear on this 
point. The first page of the Agreement gives a precise legal 
description of the Velvet and Royal Flush claims and then 
1ounediately abbreviates that description with the phrase "said 
1 d1rns " Agreement at 1, R. 1536. The first page of the 
Operating Agreement does the same. Operating Agreement at 1, R. 
1546 In case there could be any confusion, Section I of the 
Operating Agreement then makes the Agreement effective "so long 
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a• any of the mining claims hereinabove identified and described 
li.. • 
are in force and effect." Id. at 2, R. 1547 (emphasis added1 
B'h Agreements repeatedly use the phrase "said claims" without 
ever hinting that any limitation to a "mine," "shaft," or "ore 
body" might be intended. Indeed, before any of these terms even 
appear in the Operating Agreement, the phrase "said claims" has 
already been employed several times in direct reference to the 
legal description of all of the Velvet Claims. See id. at 1-2, 
R. 1546-47. Thus, Atlas' suggestion of an implicit synonymity is 
flatly at variance with the language of the Agreements. 
3. The provisions subjecting "all ores" to the 
Net Profits Interest. 
The Agreements expressly contradict the construction 
proposed by Atlas that the Net Profits Interest applied only to 
ores from an initial mining venture and thus is not applicable to 
ores produced from the Velvet Mine. The Net Profits Interest 
expressly applies to "all ores mined, produced, saved and sold 
from said claims." Operating Agreement at 4, R. 1549 (emphasis 
added). Atlas now seeks to avoid this provision by suggesting an 
ingenious construction; the phrase "all ores" does not mean "all 
ores," but rather "all kinds of ores," 8 .. uranium, vanadium, 
thorium, manganese, etc. Atlas Brief at 38-39. 
This construction simply does not work. The construe-
tion merely reads into the Agreements a limitation that cannot be 
found anywhere in, and indeed is contradicted by, the language of 
the Agreements. To be sure, the Net Profits Interest is 
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.,.1«able to all kinds of ores, as the phrase "all ores" 
8'1fgests and as the Agreement specifies. Agreement at 23-24, R. 
1~6-37. But it hardly follows that because "all ores" can be 
understood to include "al 1 kinds of ores" it can then be read to 
mean "some of all kinds of ores." The term "all ores" cannot be 
metamorphased into "not all ores," simply by the use of an 
intermediate step. 
4. The provisions expressly contemplating sub-
sequent "exploration, drilling, development, 
[and] mining." 
Section III of the Operating Agreement expressly pro-
vides for "exploration, drilling, development, [and] mining" 
after the development of the "initial" mine, thereby destroying 
Atlas' position that the Agreements contemplated a sequence of 
opeiations that would be performed only once. Operating Agree-
ment at 3, R. 1548. See also Agreement at 5, R. 1540. Attempt-
i~ to explain away these provisions, Atlas suggests that the 
language refers only to additional exploration, drilling, and 
mining that might be performed on the initial ore body. At las 
Brief at 37-38. 
Typically, Atlas is not troubled by the fact that the 
language of the Agreements suggests no such limitation, and 
JildPed explicitly refers to later exploration and mining of "said 
1 ia1ms," not of "said ore body." Operating Agreement at 3, R. 
1548. Even if these textual problems could be overlooked, the 
argument merely evidences Atlas' inability to make up its mind as 
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to why the Agreements terminated. Earlier, as has been ex 
i.'-
P\f'ined, Atlas purported to find in the Agreements a "one 
bJLy" limitation. See supra p. 1. For good reason, Atlas 
ore 
no"' 
pu-i:ports to eschew that position, 7 and in its present brief 
tries to develop a construction based on the assumption that the 
Agreements contemplated a sequence of operations that would be 
performed only once. Atlas Brief at 34-37. That construction, 
however, is in turn prevented by the express provisions governing 
continued operations after the first sequence of operations. In 
addition, the "single sequence" argument is not strengthened by 
Atlas' attempt to smuggle back into the case the already 
discarded "one ore body" theory. 
Atlas has seemingly adopted a "flip-flop" strategy. 
Faced with insurmountable difficulties in the "one ore body" 
theory, Atlas recants and proposes a "single sequence" construe-
tion instead; but when that construction collides head-on with 
the text of the Agreements, Atlas tries to gloss over the problem 
by hauling out (though only for a moment) the "one ore body" 
7 L.L_, Atlas Brief at 49: "THE AGREEMENTS, and the mining ven-
ture, applied to whatever Kerr-McGee found in its testing, 
defining and developing of the SUBJECT CLAIMS. As it turns out, 
only one ore body (the BARDON MINE) was discovered, defined and 
developed. As it turned out, only one shaft was used. The 
AGREEMENTS did not terminate because, from the outset, they were 
limited to a single ore body." 
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The flip-flop maneuver merely highlights the 
in~uperable flaws in Atlas' position. 
~ D. Considered as a Whole, the Agreements Preclude the 
Construction Favored by Atlas. 
Insisting that the Operating Agreement must be read as 
a whole, Atlas suggests that the Clovis Banks' construction is 
based entirely on the first and last sections of the Operating 
Agreement. Atlas Brief at 34-35. These provisions have been 
discussed at length in the Clovis Brief and need not be repeated 
at length here. Very briefly, it may be noted that Section I 
unambiguously makes the duration of the Operating Agreement 
coterminous with the existence of the Claims, Operating Agreement 
§I, R. 1547; that the Operating Agreement's recitals provide 
that the Interest Owners "have reserved unto themselves an 
undivided net profits interest in and to the net profits 
from all ores, mined, saved, removed, and sold from said claims," 
Id. at 1, R. 1546 (emphasis added); that Section III contains a 
similar provision, as well as language expressly contemplating 
continuing exploration, development, and mining, Id. § III, R. 
1548-49; that Section V explicitly provides for "mines" (in the 
plural), Id. § V, R. 1550-51; and that Sections VIII and XVIII 
arp ullambiguous in providing that all terms of the Agreement 
•nulJ bind successors and assigns. Id. §VII, at 9, R. 1554; Id. 
\XVIII, R. 1560. 
Thus, the Clovis Banks' construction is supported by 
numerous provisions throughout the Operating Agreement. By 
-17-.. 
contrast, it is Atlas whose construction of the Agreements is 
-' 
bated solely on an interpretation of language in Section III of 
tJ Operating Agreement. 
II~ THE NET PROFITS INTEREST IS AN ESTATE IN LAND BINDING UPON 
ATLAS. 
Atlas next asserts that the parties to the 1957 Agree-
ments did not intend to create a perpetual net profits interest 
with characteristics of other estates in land. As a result, 
Atlas agrues, the interest does not bind it under generally 
accepted principles of contract law. However, rather than 
provide substantive rebuttal to the Clovis Banks' position that 
the Net Profits Interest is an interest in land, Atlas merely 
repeats its prior argument that the Agreements terminated and 
that the Net Profits Interest was somehow abandoned in the 
process. 
A. The Net Profits Interest Is An Interest in Land 
Binding Upon Subsequent Owners of the Claims. 
Atlas' argument is based upon its conclusion that 
"[n)one of the authorities cited by the Clovis Banks stand for 
the proposition that all net profits interests are mineral 
interests or estates in land or any other perpetual interest.·· 
Atlas Brief at 42-43 (emphasis added). The Clovis Banks have not 
asserted, and do not here assert, that all net profits interests 
are interests in land. The Clovis Banks do assert, however, that 
an analysis of the Net Profits Interest created by the April 18, 
1957 Agreement demonstrates that it is an estate in land, rather 
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'""" a mere "share in a coDDDon fund of profits" unrelated to the 
,[pms, as contended by Atlas. Atlas Brief at 42. 
f Atlas agrees that "net profits interests may share some 
if the characteristics of an overriding royalty interest, a 
~yalty, a working interest, or a carried interest." Atlas Brief 
at 42. Atlas then inconsistently asserts that the Net Profits 
Interest defined in the Agreements is "unlike any of those 
interests." Id. (emphasis added). First, Atlas asserts that the 
Net Profits Interest is unlike a royalty interest because a 
royalty "is not a cost bearing interest at all, and is calculated 
>ithout respect to costs or profits." Id. at 42 n. 115. Incred-
ibly, Atlas apparently overlooks the fact that both a working 
interest and a carried working interest -- each of which are 
indisputably estates in land are cost-bearing interests cal-
culated on costs or profits. 
Second, Atlas emphasizes that the Net Profits Interest 
is a "share in a common fund of profits and [the Interest 
01.ners'] share is dependent upon the operations attaining a 
specific level of profits." Id. It is patently obvious, of 
cnurse, that any interest, such as a working interest, that is 
·:dcu1ated on a "net" basis 8 comes from a coDDDon fund of 
8 
Even gross proceeds royalties frequently share some costs, 
such as transportation or smelting charges. Gushee, Drafting 
~ctical Royalty Clauses for the Mining Lease, 2 Rocky Mtn. Min. 
L. Fdn. 625, 634-640 (1975). As a result, these interests are 
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profit•, because if one interest owner receives a specified 
,, 
percentage 
iJf what is 
of proceeds, the other interest owners can only share 
left of the common fund. Indeed, this point rein-
forces the characterization of the Net Profits Interest as an 
interest in land. The Net Profits Interest is measured as a 
share of common production from the Claims, rather than an 
interest in Atlas' revenues generally. Atlas provides no 
authority for the proposition that sharing in a common fund of 
proceeds from production somehow destroys the nature of the Net 
Profits Interest as an interest in land. Atlas' argument seems 
to be that by merely calling the Net Profits Interest a "profit 
sharing arrangement" it will be held to be a mere contract 
right. 9 
Third, Atlas points out that that working interest 
owners have executive rights and the obligation to pay expenses 
but the Interest Owners do not. At las Brief at 42 n. 115. 
Because of this, Atlas concludes, the Net Profits Interest cannot 
be a working interest. Once again, Atlas overlooks the fact that 
these characteristics are exactly those reflected in the royalty 
likewise dependent upon operations achieving a specific level of 
profitability in order to produce financial returns. 
9
Interestingly, the parties to the Agreements never referred to 
the Net Profits Interest as a "profit sharing arrangement," but 
called it a "net profits interest" that was "reserved unto 
themselves." Operating Agreement at 1, R.. 1546. 
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,,, , .est and the carried working interest, both of which are 
, 19 sely related to net profits interests and are uniformly recog-
nMed as interests in land. 10 Atlas also ignores the fact that 
tire parties executed an Operating Agreement, an indication that 
the parties believed that the Interest Owners had executive 
11 
rights. 
Finally, Atlas attempts to rely on two authorities, 
Atlas Brief at 41 n. 114, to support the proposition that net 
profits interests are not recognized as interests in land. 12 
To be sure, as At las quotes, one authority contends that "any 
consideration of the nature of the net profits interest arrange-
ment, which cont a ins no further speci fi city beyond the words 'net 
10see 2 H. Williams & C. Meyers, Manual of Oil and Gas Terms 
84(1982) (noting "the close kinship between carried interests 
and net profits interests"). Just as carried interests, net 
profits interests are "carved out of the working interest." Id. 
at 457. The close relationship between the Net Profits Interest 
and working interests is further bolstered by the 
characterizations used by the Interest Owners. See Clovis Brief 
at 41-43. 
11 
Only owners of executve rights must execute an operating 
agreement, which is defined as "an agreement among concurrent 
owners of interests in land." 2 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra 
note 10, at 505. 
!? 
"In the Clovis Brief, the Clovis Banks presented substantial 
•upport for the proposition that the phrase "net profits 
interest" is recognized as a term of art that describes an 
interest in land. Because Atlas has not attempted to refute 
those authorities, the Clovis Banks will not repeat their argu-
ment here. 
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profits interest' per se, is a leap into fantasy "13 
Atfas fails, however, to reveal to the Court that this autho-
rtly•a discomfort with the use of these words is not focused upon 
the concept that the interest is not an estate in land, but is 
due to the fact that many times, the needed "further specifity" 
is missing from the defining document. However, where that 
specificity is present -- as in the instant case -- Atlas' own 
authority agrees that "[n]et profits interests continue from and 
after their creation for the term of the property interest from 
which they are created so that a net profits interest is created 
from the working interest and is a continuing burden upon it." 
Sherrill, supra note 13, at 168. The other authority relied upon 
by Atlas is similarly quoted out of context and in fact supports 
the Clovis Banks' contentions. 14 
13sherrill, Net Profits Interests - A Current View, 19 Inst. on 
Oil & Gas L. & Tax'n 165, 166 (l968)(emphasis added). Sherrill 
notes that "[t]he frequent use through the years of net profits 
interest arrangements has tended to lead many practioners to 
consider the words 'net profits interest' to be words of art 
describing a unique interest -- almost in the same sense as do 
the words 'overriding royalty."' Id. at 165. 
14
Atlas relies on 5 E. Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and 
Gas §63.5 (1978). Professor Kuntz recognizes, as the Clovis 
Banks stated in the Clovis Brief, that net profits interests have 
not received broad treatment in the courts. Clovis Brief at 33. 
~untz also recognizes, as Atlas points out, Atlas Brief at 41 n. 
114, that a net profits interest may be an interest in land and 
determination of the issue depends upon the provisions of the 
instrument creating it. 5 E. Kuntz, supra §63.5. The Clovis 
Banks have urged this Court to make such a determination by 
analyzing the characteristics of the Net Profits Interest and its 
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B. The Net Profits Interest was Properly Created in 
the Agreement and the Deed. 
~ Atlas next objects to the manner in which the Net 
Profits Interest was created. Atlas Brief at 44 n. 118. Atlas 
asserts that the April 18, 1957 Agreement "did not define a net 
profits interest." Id. In fact, the Agreement uses an entire 
paragraph to define it, ~ Agreement ~6, R. 1540-41, and the 
Operating Agreement and attached Accounting Procedure, which are 
incorporated into the Agreement, devote even greater length to 
the definition, Operating Agreement § § III, IV, R. 1548-49. 
Indeed, in the Operating Agreement, the parties used terms of art 
generally applicable to real property interests in describing the 
interest created in the Agreement: "[SJ aid Interest Owners have 
reserved unto themselves an undivided net profits interest 
" Operating Agreement at 1, R. 1546. Thus, the parties viewed 
t~ Agreement as creating and defining the Net Profits Interest 
and the Operating Agreement as governing the working relationship 
of that interest with the interests being conveyed to Kerr-McGee 
and Mercury. 
close affinity to other interests in land. Clovis Brief at 
IJ 41. Because the Net Profits Interest is absolutely dependent 
~an, and is measured by production from, the Claims and because 
of the way the parties characterized it, even Professor Kuntz 
should be satisfied that the Net Profits Interest is an interest 
in land. 
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Finally, the Deed was made expressly "subject to the 
te~s. covenants and conditions in that certain agreement dated 
t1't 18th day of April, 1957 by and between the parties hereto." 
Mining Deed at 2, R. 1533. The use of the words "subject to" 
limited the estate that passed to Mercury and Kerr-McGee and 
excluded from the conveyance the interest created in the Agree-
ment. Atlas objects to this reasoning on the basis that "the 
words 'subject to' do not mean incorporate by reference." Atlas 
Brief at 44 n. 118. However, it is commonly recognized that 
"subject to" may mean charged with, subordinate to, conditioned 
upon, limited by, or reserving. 15 Moreover, the language used 
in the Deed is not a typical "subject to" limitation that appears 
as boilerplate in most deeds. Rather, the Deed makes the 
conveyance expressly "subject to the terms, covenants and 
conditions" contained in the Agreements, which undeniably 
includes the obligation to pay a share of proceeds to the owners 
of the Net Profits Interest. 
A number of courts, including the Supreme Court of 
Utah, have gone so far as to recognize that the words "subject 
to" can operate to reserve an interest from a conveyance, see 
15see 40 Words & Phrases 591-97 (1964 & Supp. 1983). It is 
interesting to note that Atlas describes the conveyance to 
Kerr-McGee and Mercury as being "subject to" the Bowen royalty 
thus apparently recognizing that the words can be appropriately 
used to show that an interest passed in a deed is limited or 
burdened by a previously created interest. Atlas Brief at 7. 
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Aspen Acres Association vs. Seven Associates, Inc., 29 Utah 
!•J.303, 508 P.2d 1179 (1973); Johnson v. Peck, 90 Utah 544, 63 
pjd 251 (1937), and that the intent of the parties, rather than 
the technical use of the words controls the effect of such terms. 
See Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979). Indeed, in 
Hendrickson v. Freericks, 620 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1981) the Alaska 
Supreme Court recognized that "a number of cases interpreting 
(the words 'subject to'] as creating a reservation of rights in 
the granter involve the reservation of an easement or subsoil 
rights to minerals." Id. at 209. If use of the words "subject 
to" can work to create a reservation of a new interest in an 
instrument, then no question should exist that the words "subject 
to" as used in the Deed executed on June 7, 1957 could exclude 
from the conveyance the interest created in the Agreement 
executed on April 18, 1957. Courts have uniformly viewed such 
language to mean, at the very least, that the grant is limited by 
some pre-existing right, such as the right to share proceeds as 
defined in the Agreements. See, ~. , Hyman v. District of 
Columbia, 247 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Cockrell v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 157 Tex. 10, 299 S.W.2d 672, 678 (1957). 
The Supreme Court of Texas and the New Mexico Supreme 
1.ourt have likewise very recently ruled that a deed made "subject 
tu" some other interest or instrument, binds the grantee under 
the deed and its successors with that interest or instrument. In 
~estland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903 
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(Tex. 1982), a conveyance was made in a manner remarkably similar 
<' 
to,f hat used in the present case: 
f. this Assignment shall be subject to all the 
· provisions of that certain Operating Agree-
ment dated March l, 1968 by and between 
Assignor and Assignee. The provisions hereof 
shall be binding upon, and inure to the 
benefit of the parties hereto and their 
respective heirs, devisees, legal repre-
sentatives, successors and assigns. 
Id. at 906. In holding that the assignees and their successors 
were bound by the equitable interests described in the March l, 
1968 Operating Agreement, the Court stated: 
[W]e hold that the reference to the March l, 
1968, operating agreement contained in the 
Hay 22, 1973, assignment from Mobil to Gulf 
and Superior, as a matter of law, charged 
Gulf and Superior with the duty of inspecting 
said agreement. As a result, Gulf and 
Superior were charged with notice of the 
November 15, 1966, letter agreement and the 
equitable claim of Westland, and cannot enjoy 
the status of innocent purchasers. 
Id. The same logic should control in the case at hand and Atlas' 
interest in the Claims should be held to be burdened by the Net 
Profits Interest. 16 
16
1n National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 381 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1964), a case similar to the instant case, the Texas 
Court of Civil Appeals held that a grantee under a deed made 
"subject to" a previously created but unrecorded net profits 
interest was bound by the deed and obligated to honor the 
interest: 
The rule is that where a person takes a con-
veyance of land and in the deed into him, 
which is accepted by him, it is recited that 
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THE NET PROFITS INTEREST IS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST ATLAS AS A 
~QVENANTRUNNINGWfTH THE LAND BOTH IN LAW AND IN EQUITY. 
Atlas argues in its brief that the Net Profits Interest f 
15 not enforceable because Atlas and the Clovis Banks were not 
the original parties to the Agreements. Atlas Brief at 53-54. 
Atlas relies on a 1954 decision of a Texas appellate court, LeBus 
~. 269 S.\ol.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), for the broad 
proposition that the Net Profits Interest in this case is "at the 
most a contract right" unenforceable against successors that have 
not expressly assumed the obligations imposed by the Agreements. 
Atlas· reliance on LeBus, however, is misplaced. In LeBus, the 
issue presented was whether a partnership existed under the facts 
before the court, not whether net profits interests are generally 
enforceable against successors in interest . 17 
he takes it subject to some contract he there-
by admits its existence and its validity as of 
that time. He cannot attack its validity be-
cause he has acknowledged its valid existence 
as of that time and as a part of the consider-
ation has contracted to honor it. 
Id at 662 (citations omitted). See also LexPro Corp. v. Snyder 
E_riters .. Civ. No. 14848 (N.M. sept. 21, 1983), N.M. St. Bar Bull. 
1045 (Oct. 6, 1983). 
;_/_ 
ln Le Bus, two brothers had been engaged in several oil and 
!.as ventures. On one occasion, one brother did not have 
\ 0 fl1c1ent capital to participate in the purchase of a particular 
lease. The brothers consequently entered into an oral agreement 
that if the non-cash contributing brother rendered services in 
negotiating lease terms for acquisition of the desired lease, the 
other brother would pay to the service contributor 1/4 of the net 
Profits of any resale or 1/4 of the net profits of production. 
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Under the law of real covenants, successors in interest 
L' are bound by the terms of covenants that are related to land, 
w~hout expressly assuming any obligations. Indeed, enforce-
abllity of covenants without express assumption is the basis for 
the law of real covenants. As the Clovis Banks demonstrated in 
their brief, the covenant to pay net profits is enforceable 
against Atlas both in law and in equity. Several points raised 
in the Atlas Brief distort the law and the facts and, therefore, 
merit further mention. 
A. The Net Profits Interest is Enforceable At Law. 
The Clovis Brief addresses the elements required for 
real covenants to run with land at law and demonstrates that 
those elements are satisfied in this case. Clovis Brief at 
51-59. The Net Profits Interest touches and concerns both the 
possessory estate in the Claims and the Interest Owners' 
retained interest; the element of privity is satisfied; and the 
parties clearly intended the covenant to run with the land. 
Atlas agrees that if these elements are present, the covenant 
The court determined that it was the intent of the parties only 
to enter a contract for personal services as opposed to a part-
nership agreement. Therefore, when the service contributor died, 
the personal service contract terminated and there was no 
partnership interest for the heirs of the service contributor to 
inherit. Because LeBus deals with strictly a partnership ques-
tion, there is no way it can be even remotely construed as 
authority for the proposition that net profits interests are held 
to be contract rights. 
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0
• 11 run at law, but asserts that none of the elements is 
eg\1sfied in this case. Atlas Brief at 55. 
ti 
1. The covenant to pay net profits touches and 
concerns the Interest Owners' retained 
interest in the Claims. 
The thrust of Atlas' argument is that, because the 
Clovis Banks have not succeeded to a sufficient estate in the 
Claims, the covenants in the Operating Agreement do not satisfy 
the requirement that the covenants "touch and concern" the land. 
Atlas' argument fails, however, to address adequately the cases 
and authorities cited by the Clovis Banks, which demonstrate that 
the rights in the Claims retained by the Interest Owners (to 
which the Clovis Banks have succeeded) constitute a sufficient 
estate to satisfy these elements. 18 Instead, Atlas focuses on 
two decisions of this Court, Atlas Brief at 57-58, which deal 
with the issue of whether the covenant must be related to the 
physical use of land, and an isolated 1943 decision of the West 
18
Clovis Brief at 53-54. It is unnecessary for this Court to 
engage in the type of detailed inquiry into the exact label that 
should be placed on the retained interest, as Atlas seems to urge 
is necessary. See Atlas Brief at 59 n. 169. Such rights have 
rereived variouslabels in the unique context of the mineral 
•Hate, as remainders, possibilities of reverter and others. 
See, ~._g., Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620 (Wyo. 1983). 
Regardless of the label, courts uniformly enforce covenants to 
pay royalties under the law of real covenants whether based on 
gross or net proceeds. See cases cited in the Clovis Brief at 
53-54. -
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Virginia Supreme Court, id. at 59, which has been severely criti-
' L 
ci!ed by oil and gas law authorities. 
r. As pointed out in the Clovis Brief, Clovis Brief at 52, 
this Court has stated in dicta in the specific context of land 
development, that a covenant must have a permanent effect of a 
physical nature on land itself to satisfy the touch and concern 
element. See First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons and Reed Co., 27 
Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971) (dicta). However, in the later 
case of Lundeberg v. Dastrup, 497 P.2d 648 (Utah 1972), this 
Court restated the test in its holding: 
In order for a covenant to run with land it 
must be of such character that its perform-
ance or nonperformance will so affect the 
use, value, or enjoyment of the land itself 
that it must be regarded as an integral part 
of the property. 
Id. at 650 (emphasis added). Thus, the test does not look to 
whether the covenant has an effect of a physical nature on the 
land, but whether the performance or nonperformance affects the 
use, value or enjoyment of land. 19 The covenant to pay the Net 
Profits Interest in this case affects the use, value, and 
enjoyment of both the covenant ors' and covenantees' interests in 
19Indeed, the Lundberg court went on to list specific covenants 
affecting the use, value or enjoyment of land, which obviously 
have no effect of a physical nature: "Examples are the covenants 
of seizen, the right to convey, freedom from encumbrances, and of 
quiet peaceable possession." Id. Accord Hudspeth v. Eastern 
Oregon Land Co., 430 P. 2d 353, 356(0r--:-1967). 
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,h;, Claims, and therefore satisfies the touch and concern element 
as ~phrased by this Court in Lunde berg. 
r To bolster its position that the touch and concern 
element is not satisfied, Atlas relies heavily on the case of 
Mcintosh v. Vail, 126 W.Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d 607 (1943). 20 That 
case, however, adopts an extreme minority position and has been 
criticized by authorities in the mining and oil and gas 
field. 21 The majority of courts and authorities do not follow 
the West Virginia view. As noted in the Clovis Brief, covenants 
to pay royalties whether based on net or gross proceeds, are 
20
rn Mcintosh, the court held that specific language used in an 
instrument did not evidence an intent to make a covenant to pay 
an oil and gas royalty a real covenant. The decision was 3 to 2 
md the dissent adopts the orthodox view that covenants to pay 
mineral royalties are real covenants. 
21
Referring to the West Virginia line of decisions that 
includes Mcintosh, Williams and Meyers state, "Fortunately this 
contribution to the learning on oil and gas law has not received 
wide circulation." 1 H. William & C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law 
§304.9, at 494.1 n.8 (1981). The early West Virginia cases 
apparently adopt a rule of construction influenced by Coke's Rule 
which states: "But if a man seized of lands in fee by his deed 
granteth to another the profits of those lands, ... the whole 
land itself doth pass; for what is land but the profits thereof. 
" Coke upon Littleton 4b (17th ed. 1817). To avoid the 
rule that the fee follows a grant of the profits, older West 
Virginia cases favor a construction of mineral grants and 
reservations limiting the duration of royalty-type interests. 
See 1 H. Williams & C. Meyers, supra at §304.9. As suggested by 
Williams and Meyers, this Court should avoid introducing this 
archaic rule into Utah law. 
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uniformly accepted as 
anli run with land. 
22 
satisfying the "touch and concern" element 
;. 2. The parties plainly expressed their intent 
that the covenant was to run with the land. 
Atlas next asserts that the parties did not have the 
necessary intent for the covenant to pay net profits to run with 
the land, despite the plain language in the Agreements that its 
terms and provisions "be deemed to be covenants running with the 
land," Operating Agreement at 9, R. 1554, and that the terms and 
provisions are binding on "heirs, administrators, successors and 
assigns." Id. at 15, R. 1560. Atlas attempts to negate this 
plain language with two arguments. First, Atlas asserts that the 
language in Section VIII of the Operating Agreement deals only 
with the rights of Kerr-McGee and Mercury. Second, Atlas argues 
that the language in Section XVIII is "standard boilerplate" 
somehow not intended to refer to successors and assigns and not 
specific enough to express an intention that the Net Profits 
Interest runs with the land. 23 These arguments are without 
22clovis Brief at 53-54. Because the interest retained in the 
Claims by the Interest Owners (to which the Clovis Banks are 
direct successors) is sufficient to satisfy the "touch and 
concern" requirement, it necessarily follows that the element of 
privity is also satisfied. See 5 R. Powell, The Law of Real 
Property, ,673[2], at 60-64 (1981). 
23Atlas bases this argument, in part, on the district court's 
conclusion that many of the terms, covenants and conditions in 
the Operating Agreement are purely mechanical matters which could 
not have been intended to run. Atlas Brief at 61. However, the 
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"" 1 r and ignore the well established rule of construction that 
"~[Jn express statement of the parties as to the 'running' of the 
cik.enant should normally be decisive." 24 
Section VIII of the Operating Agreement directly 
addresses the possibility of a transfer of the Claims to succes-
sors of Kerr-McGee and Mercury and provides, without limitation, 
that: 
All sales made by either Kermac or Mercury or their 
respective successors in interest, shall be subject to 
the terms, covenants and conditions of this Agreement, 
and such terms, covenants and conditions shall be 
deemed to be covenants running with the land and the 
mineral estate covered hereby and with such transfer or 
assignment thereof. 
Operating Agreement at 9, R. 1554 (emphasis added). This lan-
guage expressly applies to the terms, covenants and conditions of 
the Agreement, not just the terms, covenants and conditions of 
Section VIII, as concluded by the district court. This section 
of the Agreement is the most logical place for the parties to 
express their intent that the covenants within the Agreement were 
terms and covenants of Operating Agreements (including so-called 
mechanical matters) are commonly enforced against successors in 
interest. See, !...:_&., Westland Oil Development Corp. v. Gulf Oil 
~., 637 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. 1982). 
14 
5 R. Powell, supra note 22, 11673[2] at 60-52; Clovis Brief 
at 53-54. The only exception to this rule is where one of the 
other elements is missing. See 5 R. Powell, supra note 22, 'IT 
673[2] at 60-53. As demonstrated above and in the Clovis Brief, 
the elements of privity and touch and concern have been met in 
this case. 
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to run with the land. Indeed, there is no other way that the 
l. 
pa~ties could have more plainly expressed this intent. Simi-
1J!1y, in Section XVIII of the Operating Agreement the parties 
exi)ressly repeated their intent that the Agreements were not 
binding on only the initial parties to the Agreement: 
The terms and provisions of this Agreement shall be 
binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the 
parties hereto, their respective heirs, administrators, 
successors and assigns. 
Id. at 15, R. 1560 (emphasis added). Again the parties referred 
to the terms of the Agreement in expressing their devolutive 
intent. 25 
Atlas relies solely on the case of City of Glendale v. 
Arizona Savings & Loan Association, 2 Ariz. App. 379, 409 P.2d 
25Atlas asserts that this language means only that "one who 
accepts an assignment of the AGREEMENTS can enforce them against 
those parties to the AGREEMENTS who were not parties to the 
assignment," and that this language does not address purchasers 
of the Claims who do not accept an assignment. Atlas Brief at 
61. This argument is wholly without merit. Section XVIII 
expressly makes both the burdens and benefits of the Agreement 
binding on "successors and assigns" of all the parties to the 
Agreement. The definition normally attributed to the term 
"assigns" as used in the Agreements, includes "all those who take 
either immediately or remotely from or under the assignor, 
whether by conveyance, devise, des cent or act of law." Black's 
Law Dictionary, "Assigns" (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Moreover, the 
term "assigns" is the language normally used to express the 
intent that covenants are to run with land. See 5 R. Powell, 
aupra note 22, t673[2), at 60-51. There is no evidence here that 
the parties intended the term "assigns" to have an unorthodox 
aeaning. Atlas acquired its interest in the Claims by conveyance 
and therefore is bound to the terms of the Agreement as an 
"assign." 
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199 (1965), for its argument that the language in the Agreement 
is[ not specific enough to show the parties' intent that the 
c'enant to pay net profits runs with the land. Glendale, 
however, is clearly distinguishable from this case on its facts. 
The instrument involved in that case contained a provision 
similar to Section XVIII of the Operating Agreement. That 
general language, however, was negated by other specific language 
in the instrument which was in conflict with the devolutive 
intent expressed in the general provision. In this case, there 
are no specific provisions in the Operating Agreement that even 
remotely negate the general devolutive language in Section XVIII. 
B. The Net Profits Interest is Enforceable in Equity. 
Atlas argues that the covenant to pay net profits 
should not be enforced in equity based upon an assumption that 
equity requires a technical application of certain elements. The 
Utah Supreme Court has not previously adopted such a position, 
Mr should it do so now. As discussed at length in the Clovis 
Brief, the key to the doctrine of enforceability of a covenant in 
equity is notice. Clovis Brief at 56-57. This doctrine is based 
upon the broad ground that where a purchaser acquires an estate 
~th notice of an outstanding interest, the failure to enforce 
the covenant in equity would be unjust. Id. 
1. Atlas had notice of the Net Profits Interest. 
In an effort to avoid the equitable notice doctrine, 
Atlas now asserts that it did not acquire the Claims with actual 
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knowledge or notice of the Net Profits Interest and, therefore, 
a~uld not be bound. 26 The district court expressly assumed, 
fJi purposes of this summary judgment, that Atlas at least had 
constructive notice of the covenant to pay net profits. 27 
Authorities uniformly agree that even constructive notice 
satisfies the notice required for covenants to run with land in 
equity. See, !..:.A.:_, Schartz v. DRB&M Real Estate Partnership, 5 
Kan. App. 2d 625, 621 P.2d 1024 (1981); 5 R. Powell, supra note 
22, • 673[2), at 60-71 ("The rule of constructive notice charges 
a successor with notice of any equitable covenant which is duly 
recorded in a prior instrument for which the successor is re-
quired to search."). A contrary result would thwart the pro-
tection provided by the recording acts and would encourage those 
acquiring property interests to remain ignorant of interests 
disclosed by the record. 
26Atlas Brief at 63-64. The apparent thrust of Atlas' argument 
is that actual as opposed to constructive notice of the covenant 
is necessary to its enforceability in equity. 
27see Findings and Conclusions at •45 n.3, R. 2107. Under Utah 
law, all parties dealing with real property are conclusively 
presumed to be on notice of the contents of recorded documents, 
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-2 (1974), and the contents of any documents 
that are referred to in the chain of title. See Haynes v. Gibbs, 
110 Utah 54, 169 P.2d 781 (1946). Because the Agreements were 
expressly referred to in the June 7, 1957 Deed, Atlas was charged 
with notice of the contents of the Agreements at the time it 
acquired the Claims. Several additional documents of record 
plainly disclose the existence of the Net Profits Interest. See 
Memorandum of Clovis Banks at 10-13, R. 1301-04. 
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2. The Net Profits Interest is enforceable even 
if the benefit is in gross. 
f Additionally, At las argues that this Court should 
impose a strict "touch and concern" requirement in equity in 
determining if the covenant to pay net profits runs with the 
land. Atlas Brief at 62. Atlas' position is that the covenant 
should not run because the benefit does not touch and concern a 
separate parcel of land owned by the promisee, but is in gross. 
As demonstrated above and at length in the Clovis Brief, the 
benefit is not in gross, but touches and concerns the rights in 
the Claims retained by the Interest Owners. Clovis Brief at 
52-53. But even if Atlas' technical application of the touch and 
concern argument is correct, the covenant should nevertheless be 
enforced under the better reasoned view that such covenant should 
be enforced in equity if Atlas took with notice. 
The eminent authority on the law of covenants, Judge 
~arles E. Clark, concludes that no distinction should be made 
between benefits touching and concerning separate land of the 
promisee and personal benefits in determining whether the burden 
of a covenant runs with the land. 28 One authority has 
18
c Clark, Real Covenants and Other Interests Which "Run With 
L~nd" app. I, 219-26, 239-41 (2d ed. 1947). Accord LexPro Corp. 
v. Snyder Enters., Civ. No. 14848 (N.M. Sept. 21, 1983), N.M. St. 
Bar Bull. 1045 (Oct. 6, 1983). Most other authorities are in 
agreement with Judge Clark's view. See, ~. , 2 American Law of 
Property § 9.32, at 430 (1952) ("there is no logical reason to 
recognize the enforceability of legal easements in gross and deny 
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•uggested that the burden of a covenant should be defeated where 
<' th~ benefit is in gross "only if in all the circumstances the 
caltenant unreasonably restrains alienation. " 29 
The Net Profits Interest and all other types of royalty 
interests serve socially useful purposes and do not unreasonably 
restrain alienation. They allow development of mining properties 
in situations in which the mineral owner alone does not have 
sufficient capital to develop its property. Failure to enforce 
the Net Profits Interest would not only be unjust, see Clovis 
Brief at 57-58, but would be a mechanical application of the law 
of covenants that would result in the termination of a socially 
desirable type of covenant. Thus, this Court should enforce the 
covenant to pay net profits in equity because Atlas took the 
Claims with notice of the Net Profits Interest. 
the existence of equitable servitudes in gross"); 5 R. Powell, 
supra note 22, ~ 673[2], at 60-47. 
29Browder, Running Covenants and Public Policy, 77 Mich. L. 
Rev. 12, 43 (1978). Since public policy favors free alienability 
of land, some cases hold that the burden of a covenant is allowed 
to run only where the encumbrance is counter-balanced by a 
benefit to some other interest in land. See Note, Covenants 
1unning with the Land: Viable Doctrine orl:Ommon Law Relic, 7 
Hofstra L. Rev. 139, 143 (1978). However, the kinds of burdens 
imposed by covenants relating to land generally serve socially 
useful ends regardless of whether the benefit is in gross. 
Indeed, a careful analysis of decisions involving covenants shows 
that courts purporting to adhere to the strict touch and concern 
rule are liberal in allowing socially useful covenants to run 
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BECAUSE THE AGREEMENTS ARE UNAMBIGUOUS, THE CLOVIS BANKS ARE 
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A HATTER OF LAW OR, AT THE LEAST, 
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR RESOLUTION OF DISPUTED 
FACTuAL ISSUES. 
A. The Clovis Banks Are Entitled to Judgment as a 
Hatter of Law. 
The parties are in agreement that the central 
issue in this case is the meaning of the Agreements and that the 
interpretation of the Agreements is a question of law which 
should not be based upon extrinsic evidence. The decisions of 
this Court clearly provide that "whether a contract is ambiguous 
is a question of law which the court must decide before it takes 
~ evidence in clarification." Horris v. Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983) 
(emphasis added); see also Hibdon v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 
657 P. 2d 1358 (Utah 1983). Thus, this Court should look solely 
to the Agreements and the Deed to determine the nature and 
duration of the Net Profits Interest. 
Atlas asserts that the trial court adhered to this 
standard and found, without resorting to extrinsic evidence, that 
the Agreements were unambiguously limited in duration. In 
support of this assertion, Atlas relies on a conclusory statement 
to that effect in the district court's Findings and Conclusions 
(wh1~h Atlas drafted and were adopted with little modification by 
!Ven where the benefit is in gross. See id. at 158-69. 
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the district court). Atlas Brief at 47. However, although the 
di~trict court made no findings of ambiguity, the Findings and 
C~clusions of the district court are replete with specific 
extrinsic evidence which is essential to the district court's 
construction of the Agreements. 
30 
Because the district court's construction of the 
Agreements is at odds with the plain language used by the parties 
and is improperly based on extrinsic evidence, this Court should 
reject the district court's Findings and Conclusions and make its 
own determination of the meaning 31 of the Agreements. The 
Clovis Brief demonstrated in detail that the parties intended the 
duration of the Agreements and the Net Profits Interest to be 
tied to the duration of the Claims, Clovis Brief at 18-31, and 
that the terms used by the parties are unambiguous in expressing 
that intent. This Court, therefore, should consider only the 
unambiguous language of the Agreements, and reverse the suuunary 
3°For example, the district court relied on extrinsic evidence 
that major operations did not commence immediately after closure 
of the Bardon Shaft; that the Interest Owners did not assert in 
the Yucca litigation that the Net Profits Interest had not termi-
nated, that written notice to terminate the Bardon Mine was given 
to the parties' by Kerr-McGee, and that the Interest Owners did 
not exercise the option to take over the Bardon Mine. See 
Findings and Conclusions '1!'1119-24, R. 2089-91; Clovis Brief at 
60-65. 
3
lrbis Court is as capable as the district court of construing 
the Agreements. Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales, Inc., 
645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982); ~Clovis Brief at 17-18. 
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.. agroe11L, remanding the case to the trial court with directions 
, 0 enter Judgment in favor of the Clovis Banks. 
B. At the Least, if the Agreements are Ambiguous the 
Case Must be Remanded to Allow the Trier of Fact 
to Resolve Genuine Issues of Material Fact. 
At the very least, the summary judgment should be 
vacated and the case allowed to proceed to trial. If the 
language of the Agreements can somehow be interpreted to mean 
that the parties intended the Net Profits Interest not to apply 
to all ores mined from the Claims so long as the Claims are in 
effect, this Court can only conclude that the Agreements are 
ambiguous, ~., "Capable of being understood in either two or 
more possible senses." Rainier National Bank v. Inland Machinery 
i:_ci 0 , 29 Wash. App. 725, 631 P.2d 389, 393 (1981). If the Agree-
ments are ambiguous, the case must be remanded to the district 
court for the trier of fact to resolve two genuine issues of 
disputed material fact: (1) whether the parties intended the Net 
Profits Interest to be coterminous with the duration of the 
Claims or to be limited in du rat ion; and ( 2) whether the 
subsequent occurrence which supposedly caused the Agreements and 
the Net Profits Interest to terminate actually occurred. 32 
l\t las seeks to escape these disputed issues by emphasizing 
that the Clovis Banks themselves argue that the Agreements are 
unambiguous and that the Clovis Banks also moved for summary 
judgment and in that connection argued that there were "no 
genuine issues of material fact." Atlas Brief at 47, 52-53. The 
argument is little better than fatuous. The Clovis Banks con-
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1. If the Agreements are ambiguous, the material 
factual issue of the parties' intent remains 
to be resolved. 
Atlas attempts to divert this Court's attention from 
the material factual issue of the parties' intent by urging that 
the extrinsic evidence presented by the Clovis Banks is not 
probative and is not factual evidence of any intent to create a 
perpetual interest. This argument is a misleading attempt to 
cloud the material issue of the parties' intent with an evalua-
tion of the specific extrinsic evidence on the issue. 
The issue of the parties' intent is clearly material 
because, as Atlas itself admits, the nature and duration of the 
Net Profits Interest is dependent wholly upon what type of 
interest the parties intended to create. Atlas Brief at 44. 
Further, if the Agreements are ambiguous, there is no basis in 
law to exclude~ evidence of the parties' opinions, conduct and 
positions taken that is relevant in determining their intent and 
tended below -- and still contend -- that the Agreements are 
unambiguous in creating a net profits interest applicable to "all 
ores" mined from the Claims so long as the Claims are in effect, 
and thus that there is no genuine issue of fact precluding 
judgment in the Clovis Banks' favor. See,~·, Response of the 
Clovis Banks at 19-20, 78, R. 1796-97, 1855. The Clovis Banks 
clearly explained below the qualified nature of their contention 
that no genuine and material issues exist. See Objections of 
Clovis Banks to At las' Proposed Findings of Fact at 8- 9, R. 
1924-25. Atlas' counsel is no doubt familiar with the phenomenon 
of competing motions for sununary judgment, so that it is 
difficult to credit Atlas' apparent lack of comprehension of the 
Clovis Banks' position in this regard. 
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,,.tat1ons in entering into the Agreements. 33 Indeed, in 
e, 0 iuat1ng the specific extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent 
tls Court must view all of the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the Clovis Banks. Clovis Brief at 18, 66. 
If some of the extrinsic evidence relied upon by Atlas 
somehow shows an intent to limit the duration of the Net Profits 
Interest, the extrinsic evidence raised by the Clovis Banks is 
certainly sufficient to rebut that evidence and raise a genuine 
issue of disputed material fact concerning the parties' in-
tent. 34 Thus, if the Agreements are ambiguous, the trier of 
1\tlas makes a broad leap in reasoning by asserting that 
because the question of "whether the AGREEMENTS are ambiguous is 
a question of law ... extrinsic evidence of the parties later 
recollection of their subjective intent in 1957 has no probative 
value." Atlas Brief at 47. It is true that if the Agreements 
are unambiguous, the trial court should not have considered~ 
extrinsic evidence in construing the terms. It does not follow, 
however, that if the Agreements are ambiguous then evidence of 
the parties' subjective intent is not probative of what the 
parties intended the contract to mean. If the Agreements are 
ambiguous, the trier of fact may consider all extrinsic evidence 
of the parties' intent, including the parties' own testimony of 
their subjective intent ions in entering the contract. See 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); Rainier 
Nat'l Bank v. Inland Machinery Co., 29 Wash. App. 725, 631 P.2d 
359 (1981); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §212 comment 
(1981); 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §538, at 61-63 (1960). 
34
The fact that the parties used the term of art "Net Profits 
lr1 lPrest" is sufficient alone to raise the factual issue of 
•h~ther the parties intended those words to have a meaning other 
th .. n the meaning normally attributed by the mining industry. In 
Universal Investment Co. v. Carpets, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 336, 
338-39, 400 P.2d 564, 566 (1965), this Court held that where the 
contract terms had a particular meaning, the intended meaning of 
the terms was properly regarded as a factual dispute. It was 
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fact should be required to evaluate all of the extrinsic 
~' 
evldence, weigh any conflicting testimony, and observe the 
d~eanor of witnesses and determine their credibility in 
de-iermining the parties' intent. 
2. If the district court's construction of the 
agreements is adopted, the material factual 
issue of whether the "mining venture" 
terminated must be resolved. 
As pointed out in the Clovis Brief, Clovis Brief at 
68-69, assuming arguendo that the Agreements were intended to be 
limited to a "specific mining venture," this construction leaves 
unanswered the material factual issue of whether that venture 
ended in 1961 (or at sometime in 1962 as Atlas now contends). 
Unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Clovis Banks, compels acceptance of Atlas' factual premise,~ .• 
that Kerr-McGee fully explored the Claims and reached the 
conclusion that no further exploration was justified, this Court 
must reverse the summary judgment for resolution of this factual 
issue. 
In fact, no such evidence exists. There is no letter 
or memorandum from Kerr-McGee indicating that further exploration 
was unwarranted, no oral testimony to that effect, and no written 
or oral statement indicating, directly or indirectly, that any of 
therefore proper for the trial court to hear testimony by experts 
in the field as to the generally understood and accepted meaning 
of the language as used in the transaction in question. 
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~ parties to the agreements ever understood that the "mining 
veature" (if that 
' 
concept meant anything to them) had been 
r~cluded. Rather, the evidence is to the contrary. In 1962, 
after the Bardon Shaft had been abandoned, Kerr-McGee explicitly 
declared its intention to resume exploration as soon as the 
accounting difficulties created by the Bardon operation could be 
cleaned up. Letter from Kerr-McGee to Wm. Dean McDougald (Hay 9, 
1962), R. 1882. Although the prolongation of these accounting 
difficulties and Kerr-McGee's conditional assignment of the 
claims prevented Kerr-McGee itself from resuming operations, the 
Court wi 11 search the record (and the At las Brief) in vain for 
evidence that either Kerr-McGee or any of the Kerr-McGee's 
successors even made a determination that further exploration 
should not be undertaken. Moreover, as Atlas elsewhere acknow-
ledges, Kerr-McGee retained until 1970 an option to reacquire the 
Claims, Atlas Brief at 12, and ultimately relinquished the option 
only in exchange for a very valuable production royalty in the 
Claims. Deed from Kerr-McGee to Foote Minerals Co., R. 1670-72. 
Kerr-McGee's decision to retain the option, and its acquisition 
of the royalty, hardly square with Atlas' bald assertion that 
Kerr-McGee had decided that the Claims had been "fully" explored 
"'"1 that further work was unwarranted. Thus, the "terminating 
~ven" upon which Atlas relies never in fact occurred. 
Lacking any evidence of such termination, Atlas resorts 
to offuscation by emphasizing evidence showing that the parties 
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intended to terminate the operation on the Bardon Shaft. Atlas 
Brief at 52-53. No one disputes, of course, that the Bardon 
S~ft was abandoned; but such evidence is simply meaningless with 
res-pect to the issue in this case. 35 Richard T. Zitting, then 
35the Operating Agreement explicity provided in Section V for 
the abandonment of particular mines. In proposing the 
abandonment of the Bardon Shaft, Kerr-McGee specifically stated 
that the Operating Agreement applied to the Claims, referred to 
Section V and gave a precise legal description of the property to 
be abandoned, once again acknowledging that only part of the 
Claims were affected. Section V does not provide, nor did 
Kerr-McGee ever suggest, that abandonment of the Bardon Shaft 
would affect in any way the parties' rights and obligations with 
respect to the rest of the Claims. In its letter proposing 
abandonment of the Bardon Shaft, Kerr-McGee stated: 
Reference is made to that certain Operating 
Agreement dated April 18, 1957, entered into by and 
between Kerr-McGee Oil Industries, Inc., Mercury 
Uranium and Oil Company and . . [the) Interest Owners; 
which Operating Agreement pertains to the following 
described unpatented lode mining claims, to-wit: 
Velvet Claims 1-34, inclusive 
Royal Flush Claims 1-4, inclusive 
Pursuant to Article V of said Operating Agreement, 
notice is hereby given to you that Kerr-McGee Oil 
Industries, Inc. and Anderson Development Corporation 
by mutual agreement now desire to abandon the mine and 
the working in connection therewith located on and 
servicing that part (said part being the area desired 
to be abandoned) of the lands covered by the above 
described claims more particularly described as 
follows, to-wit: 
A tract of land situated in the NW/4 of Section 3, 
T. 31 S., R. 25 E., Salt Lake Meridian, San Juan 
County, Utah more fully described as follows: 
Commencing at a point 125 feet due south from the 
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,Hr-McGee's Manager of Mineral Exploration, has stated under 
oa~h that neither he nor any of the other parties ever believed 
0 / intended that the Net Profits Interest would terminate upon 
ttte winding up of the Bardon Shaft operation. 36 
Like its proposed construction of the Agreements, 
Atlas' position on the material factual issue of termination is 
hopelessly contradictory. Atlas cannot even consistently des-
cribe, let alone support, the version of the facts that it would 
like the Court to accept, and thus admits that factual issues 
remain. Though the reasons for the district court's ruling are 
admittedly obscure, the ruling is itself clear in at least two 
particulars. The district court certainly ruled, first, that the 
NW corner Section 3, T. 31 S., R. 25 E., thence 
due east 650 feet to NE corner of said tract; 
thence due south 500 feet to SE corner of said 
tract; thence due west 650 feet to SW corner of 
said tract; thence due north 500 feet to NW corner 
of said tract, the point of beginning. 
Letter from Kerr-McGee to Interest Owners (Dec. 19, 1962), R. 
1606-07 (emphasis added). 
36
see Affidavit of Richard T. Zitting, R. 1771-73. The 
abandonment of the Bardon Shaft is perhaps relevant to the issue 
in this case in one respect. The correspondence between 
Knr-HcGee and the Interest Owners shows that when the parties 
desired to terminate or abandon something, they knew how to do 
so. Kerr-McGee's letter abandoning the Bardon Shaft is clear and 
precise in identifying the authorizing provision and in 
explaining the legal effect of the abandonment. Any similar 
letter or statement declaring Kerr-McGee's supposed decision that 
further exploration was unjustified, or even hinting at any such 
decision, is conspicuously non-existent. 
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Net Profits Interest terminated in 1961, and, second, that the 
ev~nt triggering this termination was the abandonment of the 
- r.t - 37 ~ Shaft. This scenario, however, is not only without 
support in the record -- Atlas cites no evidence even suggesting 
that all of the Claims had been "fully," or even significantly, 
explored by the end of 1960 -- but is decisively refuted by 
Kerr-McGee's unequivocal declaration in 1962, more than a year 
after all operations had supposedly been wound up, that further 
38 exploration was planned. Attempting to cope with this fact, 
Atlas discreetly waits in its brief for 27 pages and then, 
completely abandoning both its own earlier position and the 
district court's ruling, proposes a wholly new scenario: 
Kerr-McGee's supposed decision to discontinue exploration on the 
claims did not occur before 1961 after all; rather, it must have 
happened "some time near December 31, 1962.'' Atlas Brief at 50 
n. 142. 
Thus, Atlas' own inconsistencies show that a dispute 
exists as to facts that are essential to the district court's 
37
Findings and Conclusions ~~ 38, 39, 41, 42, R. 2097 - 2103. 
Atlas makes occasional attempts to defend this ruling, arguing at 
one point that by the time the Bardon Shaft was abandoned in late 
1960 or early 1961, Kerr-McGee had already fully explored the 
remaining claims, so that no further operations were contemplated 
after the Bardon operation was wound up. Atlas Brief at 23 n. 
76. 
38
see Letter from Kerr-McGee to Wm. Dean McDougald (Hay 9, 
1962), R. 1882; Clovis Brief at 9-10. 
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Whichever of Atlas' factual scenarios this Court might 
choose to consider, if the Agreements are ambiguous, the evidence 
s~ws that disputed material factual issues exist. This Court, 
therefore, at the least must remand the case for the trier of 
fact to resolve these genuine and material factual issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The new arguments and theories raised by Atlas in its 
brief cannot support the district court's ruling. As shown in 
the Clovis Brief and in this Reply, this Court should reverse the 
district court's ruling and remand the case with instructions to 
enter summary judgment in favor of the Clovis Banks. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of November, 1983. 
Attorneys for The Clovis National 
Bank and The Citizens Bank of 
Clovis 
MODRALL, SPERLING, ROEHL, HARRIS 
& SISK 
Allen C. Dewey, Jr., Esq. 
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL & PARR 
Dale A. Kimball, Esq. 
Stephen J. Hull, Esq. 
~- Russell, Esq 
By L-)~£e ct ~ 
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